Service Alert
Website maintenance April 24 10pm ET
On Wednesday April 24 at 10pm ET the CELA website will be unavailable for about 15 minutes for planned maintenance.
On Wednesday April 24 at 10pm ET the CELA website will be unavailable for about 15 minutes for planned maintenance.
Showing 11561 - 11580 of 17941 items
Includes 14 illustrationsOf all the Army Air Forces' many operations in the Second World War, none was more demanding or…
important than those supporting the activity of resistance groups fighting the Axis powers. The special operations supporting the Yugoslavian partisans fighting the forces of Nazism in the Balkans required particular dedication and expertise. Balkan flying conditions demanded the best of flying skills, and the tenacious German defenses in that troubled region complicated this challenge even further. In this study, Professor William Leary examines what might fairly be considered one of the most important early experiences in the history of Air Force special operations. It is ironic that, fifty years after these activities, the Air Force today is heavily involved in Balkan operations, including night air drops of supplies. But this time, the supplies are for humanitarian relief, not war. The airlifters committed to relieving misery in that part of the world follow in the wake of their predecessors who, fifty years ago, flew the night skies with courage and skill to help bring an end to Nazi tyranny.By Major Channing M. Greene. 2015
As America's collective memory of the Second World War fades, popular history books and the entertainment industry have filled the…
knowledge gap with accounts from the European Theater. A resurgence in works focusing on the war in the Pacific has surfaced in recent years, but the topic still requires a fresh perspective. In particular, the American airborne experience in the Pacific presents a field ripe for exploration.This historical monograph argues that a careful review of the operations involving the 11th Airborne Division, the 503rd Parachute Infantry Regiment, and the 1st Marine Parachute Battalion reveals a measure of foresight on the part of those who designed campaign plans in the Pacific. General Joseph Swing's implementation of the Paraglider concept in the 11th Airborne enabled his unit to perform a variety of tasks including amphibious operations, parachute drops, and POW camp raids. The Allies' only independent parachute regiment in the Pacific, the 503rd, successfully employed the combined arms concept in its capture of Nadzab and set the conditions for the Allied reduction of Japanese defenses around Rabaul. The United States Marine Corps' short-lived experiment with airborne forces revealed the usefulness of units in multi-role functions, but ultimately betrayed an inability to execute actual parachute drops because of logistical limitations in the ocean environment.Includes 16 photos illustrationsThe author traces the AAF's development of aerial night fighting, including technology, training, and tactical operations in…
the North African, European, Pacific, and Asian theaters of war. In this effort the United States never wanted for recruits in what was, from start to finish, an all-volunteer night fighting force.For combatants, a constant in warfare through the ages has been the sanctuary of night, a refuge from the terror of the day's armed struggle. On the other hand, darkness has offered protection for operations made too dangerous by daylight. Combat has also extended into the twilight as day has seemed to provide too little time for the destruction demanded in modern mass warfare.In World War II the United States Army Air Forces (AAF) flew night-time missions to counter enemy activities under cover of darkness. Allied air forces had established air superiority over the battlefield and behind their own lines, and so Axis air forces had to exploit the night's protection for their attacks on Allied installations. AAF night fighters sought to deny the enemy use of the night for these attacks. Also, by 1944 Allied daylight air superiority made Axis forces maneuver and resupply at night, by air, land, and sea. U.S. night fighters sought to disrupt these activities as an extension of daylight interdiction and harassment efforts. The AAF would seek to deny the enemy the night, while capitalizing on the night in support of daylight operations.By Major Matthew H Fath. 2015
There are currently two contradictory schools of thought in the historiography of General Robert L. Eichelberger's generalship. One group of…
authors, John Shortal and Jay Luvaas, consider Eichelberger a brilliant World War II commander. Another author, Paul Chwialkowski, believes Eichelberger to be good, but not distinguished. This study attempts to develop a concise judgment of Eichelberger's leadership. The research analyzed Eichelberger's generalship using Clausewitz's theory of military genius as a model. The first step was to define military genius and to determine its components and subcomponents. Next, Eichelberger's pre-World War II education, mentorship, and training experiences were evaluated. The third step was to analyze Eichelberger's generalship during the Papua New Guinea, Netherlands New Guinea, and Philippines Campaigns of World War II to determine if he consistently demonstrated the qualities of military genius. This study concluded that Eichelberger definitively displayed the components of courage and determination but a judgment on his coup d'œil required a more detailed examination and warranted further research. Eichelberger's leadership is relevant to today's military officer because he successfully defeated an enemy who employed many asymmetrical tactics of potential enemies in the contemporary operating environment: anti-access denial, defense in complex terrain, and fanatical fighting abilities.By Lt -Col Alexander B Bitter. 2015
This monograph assesses the adequacy of current United States joint campaign planning doctrine within the context of conventional operations between…
similar forces within a theater of war. The study focuses on five key doctrinal planning concepts-- center of gravity, decisive points, operational reach, balance, and branches and sequels.Joint planning doctrine directly influences the national security of the United States. The foundation of effective and rigorous military planning is the body of professional doctrine that shapes and animates the planning process. The use of poor or insufficient planning doctrine may result in flawed campaign plans which unnecessarily risk the resources and prestige of the United States as well as the lives of America's servicemen and women. Successful campaigns, developed from intellectually sound and militarily thorough planning doctrine, are the building blocks of national victory in war.A case study of Japanese campaign planning efforts at the beginning of 1942 and the retroactive application of selected joint doctrine planning concepts to these efforts is the method and medium of inquiry. Japanese operational planning in 1942 contained a number of complex and difficult challenges. These challenges present a rigorous test for current doctrine. Historically, this process resulted in the disastrous attempt to invade Midway Island. Joint doctrine is assessed as adequate if its application to 1942 Japanese planning would have resulted in the development of a campaign plan potentially more successful than the historical Midway operation.This paper concludes that the rigorous application of current joint doctrine by the Japanese to the planning for the 1942 campaign would have resulted in the production of a more thorough, resilient, and potentially more successful plan. Joint campaign planning doctrine, a way to think about warfare, would have overcome the challenges involved in planning this campaign.By Major Richard H. Barnes. 2015
This thesis analyzes the political role of the German General Staff as well as civil military relations in Germany from…
the late 19th century until 1933. Specifically, it examines the rise and fall of Kurt von Schleicher. Together with Generals Paul von Hindenburg, Erich Ludendorff, and Wilhelm Groener, Schleicher shaped the politics of the Weimar Republic, right up to the end that he--unintentionally--hastened when his intrigues paved the way for Adolf Hitler's dictatorship.During World War I, the German army completed its control over the civilian administration and bureaucracy. In the Republic of Weimar 1919-1933, the military remained a powerful governmental player--as the self-anointed protector of the nation against external and internal threats, including democracy.Thus, Germany's political situation in the winter of 1932-1933 and the activities of the key players stemmed from a long-term anti-democratic socialization process amid an entrenched civil-military imbalance. As the present thesis demonstrates, Schleicher's life--from his military background to his experience as a member of Prussia's noble Junker class--coincided with Germany's tumultuous modernization. The fateful lessons that he drew from this experience ultimately spelled the end of Germany's first democracy and ushered in the calamity of the Third Reich.By Major Keith A. Lawless. 2015
This battle study investigates operational and tactical considerations of the battles of Arracourt, which took place in September 1944 as…
the 4th Armored Division of Patton's Third Army clashed with the Fifth German Panzer Army in the French province of Lorraine on the U.S. drive to the German West Wall.By examining detailed German and American unit histories, logs, and summaries, as well as personal papers, this study illuminates differences and similarities in reporting the U.S. penetration from the Nancy Bridgehead to Arracourt, the German offensive at Lunéville as a prelude to Arracourt, and the two German offensives at Arracourt, as the Fifth Panzer Army attempted to link up with a German unit cut off at Nancy.Arracourt exemplifies penetration and mobile defense and illustrates the demand for good intelligence and flexible command and control. It shows the inherent risks of piecemeal commitment of reserves, the need for timely orders and good logistical support, as well as the tactical advantages of air superiority.By Major James L Boling. 2015
This thesis analyzes the political role of the German General Staff as well as civil military relations in Germany from…
the late 19th century until 1933. Specifically, it examines the rise and fall of Kurt von Schleicher. Together with Generals Paul von Hindenburg, Erich Ludendorff, and Wilhelm Groener, Schleicher shaped the politics of the Weimar Republic, right up to the end that he--unintentionally--hastened when his intrigues paved the way for Adolf Hitler's dictatorship.During World War I, the German army completed its control over the civilian administration and bureaucracy. In the Republic of Weimar 1919-1933, the military remained a powerful governmental player--as the self-anointed protector of the nation against external and internal threats, including democracy.Thus, Germany's political situation in the winter of 1932-1933 and the activities of the key players stemmed from a long-term anti-democratic socialization process amid an entrenched civil-military imbalance. As the present thesis demonstrates, Schleicher's life--from his military background to his experience as a member of Prussia's noble Junker class--coincided with Germany's tumultuous modernization. The fateful lessons that he drew from this experience ultimately spelled the end of Germany's first democracy and ushered in the calamity of the Third Reich.By Major Thomas E Walton. 2015
The purpose of this research was to obtain a historically rooted understanding of the development, application, and adaptation of the…
British COIN approach--one from which the US has borrowed heavily. It focuses upon those factors which interfere with timely, adaptive application of current COIN doctrine as soon as the warning signs of insurgency present themselves. The price of failing to do so in terms of blood and treasure has been widely proclaimed daily in the news media during the past decade of American and British involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan.Authors on both sides of the Atlantic have already made much of the US Army's failure to capture COIN lessons from Vietnam and its abandonment of COIN education in its schools after the 1970s. For this reason, most American commanders went into Iraq with no doctrinal guide for COIN, a deficiency corrected only after painful reflection on the characteristics of the environment and the inefficacy of the conventional methods they initially employed. The British Army, on the other hand, went into Iraq with a COIN doctrine revised five times since the completion of its successful operations in Malaya, 1948-1960, including a version published only two years prior to entry into Iraq. Why did the British Army struggle with identifying insurgency and application of its own corresponding doctrine?By Major Curtis W. Hubbard. 2015
Special Forces forward operational bases (FOB) are essential for mission and contingency planning as well as for the preparation, infiltration…
and exfiltration of Operational Detachment Alphas (ODA). Therefore, the defense of this command and control headquarters is critical for preserving combat power and synchronizing military actions in a theater of operations. Because the enemy has the capability of projecting forces with the objective of disrupting US military operations, FOBs have become likely targets.According to SF doctrine, FOBs should be located in secure areas with MP or host-nation personnel providing the bulk of the security force. Although this situation is preferable, it is by no means assured. FOBs should be able to provide their own security in the event other forces are not available or when rapid deployment restricts the flow of conventional forces into a theater of operations. After-action review results from the Joint Readiness Training Center demonstrate that many SF battalions are not prepared to execute base defense tasks without the assistance of other forces. Many SF commanders do not consider base defense a mission essential task and the result is a lack of training by many of their personnel.This study analyzes joint and SF doctrine, observations from the field, and the effects of the contemporary operating environment to identify weaknesses in the readiness of SF battalions.By The Honorable Dan A. Kimball, Admiral Raymond A. Spruance, Rear Adm. Worrall Reed Carter. 2015
Includes over 150 photos.Victory is won or lost in battle, but all military history shows that adequate logistic support is…
essential to the winning of battles.In World War II, logistic support of the fleet in the Pacific became a problem of such magnitude and diversity, as well as vital necessity, that all operations against Japan hinged upon it. The advance against the enemy moved our fleet progressively farther and farther away from the west coast of the United States, from Pearl Harbor, and from other sources of supply, to support our fleet we constructed temporary bases for various uses, and we formed floating mobile service squadrons and other logistic support groups. These floating organizations remained near the fighting fleet, supplying food, ammunition, and other necessities while rendering repair services close to the combat areas, this support enabled the fleet to keep unrelenting pressure upon the enemy by obviating the return of the fleet to home bases.Because of the knowledge gained during his South Pacific service and particularly from his experience as Commander of Service Squadron Ten, the largest of the mobile squadrons, Rear Admiral W.R. Carter was chosen to write this history of logistics afloat in the Pacific. The opinions expressed and the conclusions reached are those of the author.- Secretary of the Navy, Dan KimballBy Major William W. Hamilton. 2015
One of German General Carl Von Clausewitz's key concepts is culmination. His primary work On War describes culmination for the…
attacker as the point beyond which he can no longer continue his attack and risks destruction from a counterattack. For the defender it is the point beyond which the defender gains no more advantages by continuing his defense. At this point the defender must decide to act. Clausewitz envisioned that at this point the defender would release his flashing sword of vengeance and counterattack. Clausewitz developed the concept of culmination for what we regard today as the strategic and operational levels of war. This paper seeks to answer the question, Does the concept of defensive culmination apply at the tactical level and can the tactical defender use it to determine when to counterattack?This paper uses three historical examples to examine when and how commanders executed tactical counterattacks. The examples are used to evaluate a theoretical framework of Clausewitz's defensive concepts. The criteria used to evaluate the historical cases are: defensive preparation, terrain, availability of intelligence on the attacker, timing for the defender and attacker, determination of the defender's defeat mechanism, depth of the defense, type of counterattack, the timing of the counterattack, and condition of the attacker and defender when the counterattack was executed. The key concepts examined are culmination and counterattack timing.By Major Thomas A. Dempsey. 2015
This monograph addresses the suitability of Bedouin tribes for recruitment and employment as irregular forces. The study is motivated by…
force shortfalls and resource constraints in U.S. contingency planning for Southwest Asia and the Arabian Peninsula. A partial solution to these shortfalls and constraints is offered through the employment of Bedouin irregular forces to augment U.S. contingency operations in the area.The study examines the characteristics of Bedouin society and finds that those characteristics support the recruitment and employment of Bedouin irregular forces. Three historical case studies support this conclusion, demonstrating the effectiveness of Bedouin irregulars. The case studies analyze the use of Bedouin irregular forces in the unification of Saudi Arabia prior to the First World War; under T. E. Lawrence during his campaigns in the Hejaz and Palestine from 1916 to 1918; and during the Dhofar Rebellion in Oman from 1971 to 1976.The monograph concludes that the Bedouin population of the Levant and the Arabian Peninsula constitutes a critical resource, which could be exploited to provide irregular forces in support of U.S. operations in Southwest Asia and the Arabian Peninsula. Some suggestions are offered with respect to methods of employment for such forces. The paper closes with a review of issues requiring further study, including the need for a doctrine addressing irregular warfare, and for techniques to implement that doctrine.By Major Michael J Gunther. 2015
Gen. Helmuth von Moltke, the Chief of the Prussian General Staff during the Franco-Prussian War, defined Auftragstaktik as the actions…
a subordinate took in the absence of orders that supported the senior commander's intent. The use of mission tactics allowed subordinate commanders like Crown Prince Frederick Karl, Gen. Konstantin von Alvensleben, and Gen. Karl von Steinmetz to interpret how best to achieve the commander's intent based upon their understanding of the tactical situation. The Prussian use of decentralized command during the Franco-Prussian War acknowledged the risk inherent in this system of command. Despite what modern military theorists often write, Auftragstaktik and mission command are not synonymous terms. Most authors ignore the historical environment that the Prussian military operated in during the Franco-Prussian War. This study examines the influence of the Prussian concept of Auftragstaktik on the modern US Army notion of mission command as defined within the published doctrine. It utilizes archival records and pertinent published histories from the August 1870 battles on the Franco-Prussian frontier, Moltke's 1869 Instructions for Large Unit Commanders, as well as writings from the 1980s to describe the influence of Prussian system on the modern concept of mission command.By William Y’blood. 2015
Before the Korean War, the primary mission of Lt. Gen. George E. Stratemeyer's Far East Air Forces was air defense…
of the Japanese homeland. Most of the aircraft constituting Stratemeyer's inventory were interceptors, not designed for the type of combat that would be required now that the United States was joining in the UN effort to end the war in Korea. The Joint Army/USAAF doctrine of 1946, known as Field Manual 31-35, Air Ground Operations, was also considered outdated in the present circumstance. A new approach to warfighting had to be developed in response to the strong influence of General Douglas MacArthur and other of his air officers in the Army-dominated General Headquarters Far East Command. Close air support of the ground forces as provided by Fifth Air Force came at some cost, and tempers flared in the process, but the air commanders in Korea never deprived the ground commanders of close air support if it was needed. Indeed, without the close air support provided to the airmen, the ground campaign would have been a much more bloody and difficult affair than it was.By Major John D. Dill. 2015
Five years after emerging victorious from World War II, the United States became embroiled in the Korean War. In August…
of 1950, despite the relative industrial and technological disadvantages suffered by the enemy North Korean Peoples' Army, the American Eighth Army was nearly defeated and pushed into the sea while trying to defend a toehold on the Korean peninsula around the port of Pusan. The poorly trained and equipped U.S. soldiers and marines defending the Pusan Perimeter relied heavily on fire support assets to stem the tide and defeat the North Korean attack.This monograph asks if the fire support, including both artillery and air fires, provided to the Eighth Army Infantry and Armor units was effective. It also examines the reasons for the success or failures of fire support by contrasting the use of fire support by different Army and Marine Corps units as they defended the perimeter. Additionally, the monograph addresses the question of how the force development process shaped the success or failure of the Pusan fire support effort. Finally, the monograph discusses lessons from the Pusan defense that are applicable to current fire support and force development.The monograph concludes that the fire support effort in the Pusan campaign was effective. However, because of the force reductions and training lapses that occurred after World War II in the United States Army and Air Force, it was not as effective as it could have been. The time taken to relearn the lessons of World War II and to rebuild units to doctrinal war time strength needlessly cost lives. The Pusan perimeter fight contains valuable lessons for current fire support leaders as they grapple with challenges similar to those faced by their predecessors in the summer of 1950.By Col. Lowell L. Snitchler USAF. 2015
General-of-the-Army Douglas MacArthur was a complex man whose behaviors seem contradictory on the surface. In fact, he demonstrated an enduring…
pattern of perceiving, relating to, and thinking about himself and his environment. This consistent personality is evident across a wide range of social and personal contexts and can be traced back to his developmental childhood and adolescent years.This research recounts MacArthur's personality development from childhood, investigates his last military campaign, and, finally, applies the diagnosis of narcissistic personality disorder to the assembled data. Upon reflection, MacArthur's apparent behavioral inconsistencies are reconciled within this clinical framework.Finally, organizational, heuristic and predictive implications are drawn from this research. Academic and operational military uses are suggested.By Major Jesse T. Pearson. 2015
This paper investigates the failure of British strategy during the southern campaign of the American Revolutionary War from 1780 to…
1781. Following France's entry into the war in 1778, the British Secretary of State for the American Department, Lord George Germain, believed that Great Britain could expand the war into the south with minimal cost. This research traces Lord Germain's strategy from its origin in London in 1778 to its application in the American south by British Generals Henry Clinton and Charles Cornwallis during 1780 and 1781. It also analyzes crucial British engagements with the southern patriot army at the Battle of Cowpens in January 1781, the Battle of Guilford Courthouse in March 1781, and the final withdrawal of British forces from the southern interior following the Battle of Eutaw Springs in September 1781. This research identifies four factors that contributed to the failure of British strategy in the south: (1) a false British assumption of loyalist support among the populace, (2) British application of self-defeating political and military policies, (3) the British failure to deploy sufficient forces to control the territory, and (4) patriot General Nathanael Greene's campaign against British forces.By Chester Wilmot. 2015
Includes over 50 maps and plansChester Wilmot's The Struggle for Europe is the most highly regarded single-volume history of the…
Second World War in Europe. First published in 1952, the book has the advantage of the author's extensive interviews with participants from all sides of the conflict, when recollections of the war were still painfully fresh. The pattern of post-war Europe, he maintains, was determined during the fighting; he sees the shaping events through a study of wartime diplomacy and strategy and of the impact on wartime policies of the personalities of the statesmen and generals with whom the decisions lay. Throughout Wilmot hews to one guiding principle: To concern ourselves solely with the course of military events would be to tell only half the story and to see only half its significance. It is the political outcome that counts, and in this book the two are closely related at every stage.-Print ed.By Major Hampton E Hite. 2015
This thesis is a chronological analysis of Longstreet during the thirteen major campaigns in which he participated: First Manassas, Williamsburg,…
Seven Pines, the Seven Days, Second Manassas, Antietam, Fredericksburg, Suffolk, Gettysburg, Chickamauga, Knoxville, the Wilderness, and Petersburg. The primary thesis question is: Was Longstreet's leadership during the war satisfactory when analyzed in the context of the nine leadership competencies of FM 22-100, Military Leadership?The nine leadership competencies are the result of a 1976 study group consisting of army leaders ranking from Corporal to General. The nine competencies are: supervision, soldier/team development, technical and tactical proficiency, use of available systems, professional ethics, planning, decision making, teaching and counseling, and communications.After a discussion of each campaign an analysis of Longstreet's leadership is conducted using the leadership competencies as analytical criteria. A leadership profile of Longstreet evolves as he gains experience during the war and is assigned to positions of increased responsibility.The conclusion of this thesis is that Longstreet's leadership was satisfactory during the war when analyzed in the context of the nine leadership competencies. Over the course of the thirteen campaigns mentioned above, Longstreet's leadership was satisfactory or better in a clear majority of the nine leadership competencies.The purpose of this study is to add to the Longstreet debate in a unique way. Longstreet is analyzed using nine doctrinally accepted leadership competencies to provide a constant measurement tool throughout the thesis. This should eliminate some of the emotion from the Longstreet debate.