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Showing 13241 - 13260 of 17941 items
By Captain Henry E Handerson. 2015
Henry E. Handerson, a tutor from the Western Reserve of Ohio, fifteen miles east of Cleveland, enlisted in the Confederate…
army on June 17, 1861...Handerson was not an ordinary soldier. His memoir is the account of a Northerner--who after only two years of residency in antebellum Louisiana decided to cast his lot with the Confederacy. ...Already a member of a local home guard company, the twenty-four-year-old Ohio-born Handerson was quickly enrolled as a private in the Stafford Guards, later Company B, of the Ninth Louisiana Infantry. The Ninth was first bloodied at the Battle of Front Royal, Virginia, on May 23, 1862, in a brisk fight with the Union First Maryland Infantry. As part of Stonewall Jackson's command, the regiment and Handerson marched and fought up and down the length of the Shenandoah Valley before moving down to Richmond to participate in the bloody Seven Days Battle. Handerson took part in the Fredericksburg battle, and later in the spring of 1863, was wounded in the neck at Chancellorsville. Lieutenant Handerson recovered from his wound just in time to reach Gettysburg on the last day of the battle there. In the Battle of the Wilderness, while carrying a dispatch, Handerson ran into an advancing battle line and was taken prisoner...and confined under poor living conditions, in a stockade in the direct line of fire from the Confederates at Charleston. Surviving this ordeal, Handerson wound up the war at Fort Pulaski, Georgia.Handerson's memoirs and his letters give a sympathetic picture of war and life in the Confederate army as seen through the eyes of a Northerner who lacked the emotional involvement of the native-born Southerners. His account of service with the army of Northern Virginia and as a prisoner of war is of particular value regarding the everyday details and incidents of a soldier's life. Important figures and Confederate heroes are treated fairly but objectively by this keen-eyed observer.-Edward CunninghamThis monograph discusses General George S. Patton, Jr. and Operational Battle Command. Six primary elements -- Leadership, Decision Making, Information…
Assimilation, Visualization, Conceptualization, and Communication make up the dynamics of Battle Command. General Patton mastered the application of these dynamics. This monograph defines and provides examples of the dynamics of Battle Command as used by General Patton while he commanded the Third Army.The monograph first discusses Command and Control of Third Army, as well as General Patton's relationship with his primary staff. The monograph then defines and provides examples of each of the dynamics of Battle Command using General Patton and his staff as the example.In conclusion the monograph provides three relevant lessons for future operational commanders concerning operational Battle Command based upon a historical study of General Patton. The lessons learned from the study include the training and retention of a competent staff, the commander personally focusing the intelligence effort, and the commander issuing clear intent and guidance especially regarding endstates.By Lt Col Howard S Perry. 2015
There has been a great deal of speculation and questions raised as to why the United States and the Western…
Allies allowed the Soviets to capture the Nazi capital of Berlin. This study will address a number of reasons why the U.S. did not challenge the Soviets for Berlin. In prosecuting World War II, the Soviets never forgot Clausewitz's dictum that war is a continuation of politics by other means. Stalin, who was determined to liberate every East European capital, suspected that the Allies might try a headlong rush to Berlin in April and May 1945. He therefore decided to take diplomatic and military steps to make sure the Allies would not participate in the capture of the German capital. Recent translated material made available through glasnost, provides evidence that the top USSR priority in the closing days of WWII in Europe was to block the Allied advance to Berlin and only then systematically take the city of Berlin.Includes 20 IllustrationsIn 1942 the Allied powers faced the most serious challenge to their control of the seas encountered in…
the Second World War: the menace of the U-boat. Fast, well- armed, and long-ranged, Hitler's submarines attacked shipping throughout the North Atlantic, often within sight of America's coastal towns and cities.Eventually, the combination of intelligence, land and sea- based air power, and surface vessel operations from both North American and British bases ended this threat, making possible the Allied build-up for the invasion of Europe in 1944.Flying radar-equipped long-range patrol planes, AAF airmen demonstrated the value of land-based air power against naval threats. This success has been reaffirmed consistently since the Second World War, from Vietnam and crises such as the Mayaguez incident to operations in Desert Shield and Desert Storm. The Harpoon-armed B-52s of our present-day global Air Force are the heirs of a sea-control tradition dating to the AAF's A-29s and B-24s of the Second World War.By Herbert A Mason, SSgt Randy G Bergeron. 2015
Includes 20 IllustrationsOPERATION THURSDAY -- A bold, unconventional use of American air power to support British ground troops in Burma,…
Operation THURSDAY marked a critical development in the history of modern warfare. On March 5-6, 1944, the Allies conducted an air invasion of Burma, in an attempt to push back the Japanese in the China-Burma-India Theater and re-establish the land route between India and China. U.S. airmen formed a special operations unit--the 1st Air Commando Group--to transport troops to jungle locations and resupply them, often in the line of fire. The remarkable success of this operation lives on, fifty years later, among the elite 1st Air Commando Group--a force committed to meeting the challenge of unconventional warfare any time, any place, anywhere.Includes 20 illustrationsThe strategic bombardment of Japan during World War II remains one of the most controversial subjects of military…
history because it involved the first and only use of atomic weapons in war. It also raised the question of whether strategic bombing alone can win wars, a question that dominated U.S. Air Force thinking for a generation. Without question, the strategic bombing of Japan contributed very heavily to the Japanese decision to surrender. The United States and her allies did not have to invade the home islands, an invasion that would have cost many thousands of lives on both sides.This pamphlet traces the development of the bombing of the Japanese home islands, from the modest but dramatic Doolittle raid on Tokyo in April 1942, through the effort to bomb from bases in China that were supplied by airlift over the Himalayas, to the huge 500-plane raids from the Marianas in the Pacific. The campaign changed from precision daylight bombing to night incendiary bombing of Japanese cities and ultimately to the use of atomic bombs against Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The story covers the debut of the spectacular B-29 aircraft--in many ways the most awesome weapon of World War II-- and its use not only as a bomber but also as a mine-layer.Hitting Home is the sequel to High Road to Tokyo Bay, a pamphlet by the same author that concentrated on Army Air Forces' tactical operations in Asia and the Pacific areas during World War II. Taken together, they provide an overview of U.S. Army Air Forces' operations, tactical and strategic, against Japan. The U.S. air offensive against Japan is the central story of the Pacific war--a drama of human courage and sacrifice and of a unique partnership among modern air, sea, and land forces.By Major John M Kelley. 2015
This monograph examines Claire Lee Chennault as a military theorist and campaign planner. It inquires whether Chennault's evolution of a…
theory of war assisted his planning the China-Burma-India Campaign during World War II.The monograph is divided into four sections. The first section focuses the historical background of Chennault and the war in Southeast Asia, emphasizing the war in China as this is where Chennault preponderantly fought from. In addition, it identifies the aims of the major belligerents of the Sino-Japanese War and why the Chinese actions were important to the Allied cause. The second section explores Chennault's theory of war. This section explores how he developed his theory of war and the theory itself. The third section analyzes how Chennault's theory met the Chinese and American ends (desired end state), means (application of the available resources), and ways (resource employment to achieve the ends). The fourth section concludes that Chennault's theory of war assisted him in planning the China-Burma-India campaign during the Second World War.Two functions precipitated from Chennault's theory of war. First, his theory clarified the past and the present; notably the Great War and the airpower's technological evolution. Second, it assisted Chennault to foresee the future. The future was realized because Chennault transcended the theorist role to that of an operational commander. His theory fostered an operational concept, the war of mobility, which developed into a fighting doctrine. With these resources and the invaluable contributions of the Chinese peasants, Chennault devised a method of employment that maximized the contributions from all the means. Chennault rationally created a campaign plan designed according to his theory.By Major Jonathan J. Gross. 2015
In May 1942, the Japanese found themselves in a favorable military situation. Previous successes had convinced Japanese naval planners that…
it was now possible to produce a strategic victory that could end the war through a negotiated peace. Employing the largest combined fleet of the war, the Aleutian-Midway campaign intended to satisfy that purpose. Merging the traditional battle fleet with battle proven aircraft carriers, the plan incorporated almost every major combat vessel in the Japanese Navy. Commitment of such a large force was intended to produce a high certainty for the successful accomplishment of three objectives: occupation of Midway Atoll, neutralization of the American threat from the Aleutians, and destruction of the American carrier task force. Thus, by securing the last remaining gaps in the Japanese defensive perimeter and destroying the only remaining surface threat to the Japanese homeland, the Japanese would, thereby, ensure a militarily favorable operating posture. Japanese victory in this operation conceivably would eliminate the American capability or desire to continue operations against Japan. With overwhelming combat power committed to this operation, success seemed certain. Since victory did not result from this operation, relative combat power was not the deciding factor in the battle.Includes 14 illustrationsOf all the Army Air Forces' many operations in the Second World War, none was more demanding or…
important than those supporting the activity of resistance groups fighting the Axis powers. The special operations supporting the Yugoslavian partisans fighting the forces of Nazism in the Balkans required particular dedication and expertise. Balkan flying conditions demanded the best of flying skills, and the tenacious German defenses in that troubled region complicated this challenge even further. In this study, Professor William Leary examines what might fairly be considered one of the most important early experiences in the history of Air Force special operations. It is ironic that, fifty years after these activities, the Air Force today is heavily involved in Balkan operations, including night air drops of supplies. But this time, the supplies are for humanitarian relief, not war. The airlifters committed to relieving misery in that part of the world follow in the wake of their predecessors who, fifty years ago, flew the night skies with courage and skill to help bring an end to Nazi tyranny.By Major Channing M. Greene. 2015
As America's collective memory of the Second World War fades, popular history books and the entertainment industry have filled the…
knowledge gap with accounts from the European Theater. A resurgence in works focusing on the war in the Pacific has surfaced in recent years, but the topic still requires a fresh perspective. In particular, the American airborne experience in the Pacific presents a field ripe for exploration.This historical monograph argues that a careful review of the operations involving the 11th Airborne Division, the 503rd Parachute Infantry Regiment, and the 1st Marine Parachute Battalion reveals a measure of foresight on the part of those who designed campaign plans in the Pacific. General Joseph Swing's implementation of the Paraglider concept in the 11th Airborne enabled his unit to perform a variety of tasks including amphibious operations, parachute drops, and POW camp raids. The Allies' only independent parachute regiment in the Pacific, the 503rd, successfully employed the combined arms concept in its capture of Nadzab and set the conditions for the Allied reduction of Japanese defenses around Rabaul. The United States Marine Corps' short-lived experiment with airborne forces revealed the usefulness of units in multi-role functions, but ultimately betrayed an inability to execute actual parachute drops because of logistical limitations in the ocean environment.Includes 16 photos illustrationsThe author traces the AAF's development of aerial night fighting, including technology, training, and tactical operations in…
the North African, European, Pacific, and Asian theaters of war. In this effort the United States never wanted for recruits in what was, from start to finish, an all-volunteer night fighting force.For combatants, a constant in warfare through the ages has been the sanctuary of night, a refuge from the terror of the day's armed struggle. On the other hand, darkness has offered protection for operations made too dangerous by daylight. Combat has also extended into the twilight as day has seemed to provide too little time for the destruction demanded in modern mass warfare.In World War II the United States Army Air Forces (AAF) flew night-time missions to counter enemy activities under cover of darkness. Allied air forces had established air superiority over the battlefield and behind their own lines, and so Axis air forces had to exploit the night's protection for their attacks on Allied installations. AAF night fighters sought to deny the enemy use of the night for these attacks. Also, by 1944 Allied daylight air superiority made Axis forces maneuver and resupply at night, by air, land, and sea. U.S. night fighters sought to disrupt these activities as an extension of daylight interdiction and harassment efforts. The AAF would seek to deny the enemy the night, while capitalizing on the night in support of daylight operations.By Major Matthew H Fath. 2015
There are currently two contradictory schools of thought in the historiography of General Robert L. Eichelberger's generalship. One group of…
authors, John Shortal and Jay Luvaas, consider Eichelberger a brilliant World War II commander. Another author, Paul Chwialkowski, believes Eichelberger to be good, but not distinguished. This study attempts to develop a concise judgment of Eichelberger's leadership. The research analyzed Eichelberger's generalship using Clausewitz's theory of military genius as a model. The first step was to define military genius and to determine its components and subcomponents. Next, Eichelberger's pre-World War II education, mentorship, and training experiences were evaluated. The third step was to analyze Eichelberger's generalship during the Papua New Guinea, Netherlands New Guinea, and Philippines Campaigns of World War II to determine if he consistently demonstrated the qualities of military genius. This study concluded that Eichelberger definitively displayed the components of courage and determination but a judgment on his coup d'œil required a more detailed examination and warranted further research. Eichelberger's leadership is relevant to today's military officer because he successfully defeated an enemy who employed many asymmetrical tactics of potential enemies in the contemporary operating environment: anti-access denial, defense in complex terrain, and fanatical fighting abilities.By Lt -Col Alexander B Bitter. 2015
This monograph assesses the adequacy of current United States joint campaign planning doctrine within the context of conventional operations between…
similar forces within a theater of war. The study focuses on five key doctrinal planning concepts-- center of gravity, decisive points, operational reach, balance, and branches and sequels.Joint planning doctrine directly influences the national security of the United States. The foundation of effective and rigorous military planning is the body of professional doctrine that shapes and animates the planning process. The use of poor or insufficient planning doctrine may result in flawed campaign plans which unnecessarily risk the resources and prestige of the United States as well as the lives of America's servicemen and women. Successful campaigns, developed from intellectually sound and militarily thorough planning doctrine, are the building blocks of national victory in war.A case study of Japanese campaign planning efforts at the beginning of 1942 and the retroactive application of selected joint doctrine planning concepts to these efforts is the method and medium of inquiry. Japanese operational planning in 1942 contained a number of complex and difficult challenges. These challenges present a rigorous test for current doctrine. Historically, this process resulted in the disastrous attempt to invade Midway Island. Joint doctrine is assessed as adequate if its application to 1942 Japanese planning would have resulted in the development of a campaign plan potentially more successful than the historical Midway operation.This paper concludes that the rigorous application of current joint doctrine by the Japanese to the planning for the 1942 campaign would have resulted in the production of a more thorough, resilient, and potentially more successful plan. Joint campaign planning doctrine, a way to think about warfare, would have overcome the challenges involved in planning this campaign.By Major Richard H. Barnes. 2015
This thesis analyzes the political role of the German General Staff as well as civil military relations in Germany from…
the late 19th century until 1933. Specifically, it examines the rise and fall of Kurt von Schleicher. Together with Generals Paul von Hindenburg, Erich Ludendorff, and Wilhelm Groener, Schleicher shaped the politics of the Weimar Republic, right up to the end that he--unintentionally--hastened when his intrigues paved the way for Adolf Hitler's dictatorship.During World War I, the German army completed its control over the civilian administration and bureaucracy. In the Republic of Weimar 1919-1933, the military remained a powerful governmental player--as the self-anointed protector of the nation against external and internal threats, including democracy.Thus, Germany's political situation in the winter of 1932-1933 and the activities of the key players stemmed from a long-term anti-democratic socialization process amid an entrenched civil-military imbalance. As the present thesis demonstrates, Schleicher's life--from his military background to his experience as a member of Prussia's noble Junker class--coincided with Germany's tumultuous modernization. The fateful lessons that he drew from this experience ultimately spelled the end of Germany's first democracy and ushered in the calamity of the Third Reich.By Major Keith A. Lawless. 2015
This battle study investigates operational and tactical considerations of the battles of Arracourt, which took place in September 1944 as…
the 4th Armored Division of Patton's Third Army clashed with the Fifth German Panzer Army in the French province of Lorraine on the U.S. drive to the German West Wall.By examining detailed German and American unit histories, logs, and summaries, as well as personal papers, this study illuminates differences and similarities in reporting the U.S. penetration from the Nancy Bridgehead to Arracourt, the German offensive at Lunéville as a prelude to Arracourt, and the two German offensives at Arracourt, as the Fifth Panzer Army attempted to link up with a German unit cut off at Nancy.Arracourt exemplifies penetration and mobile defense and illustrates the demand for good intelligence and flexible command and control. It shows the inherent risks of piecemeal commitment of reserves, the need for timely orders and good logistical support, as well as the tactical advantages of air superiority.By Major James L Boling. 2015
This thesis analyzes the political role of the German General Staff as well as civil military relations in Germany from…
the late 19th century until 1933. Specifically, it examines the rise and fall of Kurt von Schleicher. Together with Generals Paul von Hindenburg, Erich Ludendorff, and Wilhelm Groener, Schleicher shaped the politics of the Weimar Republic, right up to the end that he--unintentionally--hastened when his intrigues paved the way for Adolf Hitler's dictatorship.During World War I, the German army completed its control over the civilian administration and bureaucracy. In the Republic of Weimar 1919-1933, the military remained a powerful governmental player--as the self-anointed protector of the nation against external and internal threats, including democracy.Thus, Germany's political situation in the winter of 1932-1933 and the activities of the key players stemmed from a long-term anti-democratic socialization process amid an entrenched civil-military imbalance. As the present thesis demonstrates, Schleicher's life--from his military background to his experience as a member of Prussia's noble Junker class--coincided with Germany's tumultuous modernization. The fateful lessons that he drew from this experience ultimately spelled the end of Germany's first democracy and ushered in the calamity of the Third Reich.By Major Thomas E Walton. 2015
The purpose of this research was to obtain a historically rooted understanding of the development, application, and adaptation of the…
British COIN approach--one from which the US has borrowed heavily. It focuses upon those factors which interfere with timely, adaptive application of current COIN doctrine as soon as the warning signs of insurgency present themselves. The price of failing to do so in terms of blood and treasure has been widely proclaimed daily in the news media during the past decade of American and British involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan.Authors on both sides of the Atlantic have already made much of the US Army's failure to capture COIN lessons from Vietnam and its abandonment of COIN education in its schools after the 1970s. For this reason, most American commanders went into Iraq with no doctrinal guide for COIN, a deficiency corrected only after painful reflection on the characteristics of the environment and the inefficacy of the conventional methods they initially employed. The British Army, on the other hand, went into Iraq with a COIN doctrine revised five times since the completion of its successful operations in Malaya, 1948-1960, including a version published only two years prior to entry into Iraq. Why did the British Army struggle with identifying insurgency and application of its own corresponding doctrine?By Major Curtis W. Hubbard. 2015
Special Forces forward operational bases (FOB) are essential for mission and contingency planning as well as for the preparation, infiltration…
and exfiltration of Operational Detachment Alphas (ODA). Therefore, the defense of this command and control headquarters is critical for preserving combat power and synchronizing military actions in a theater of operations. Because the enemy has the capability of projecting forces with the objective of disrupting US military operations, FOBs have become likely targets.According to SF doctrine, FOBs should be located in secure areas with MP or host-nation personnel providing the bulk of the security force. Although this situation is preferable, it is by no means assured. FOBs should be able to provide their own security in the event other forces are not available or when rapid deployment restricts the flow of conventional forces into a theater of operations. After-action review results from the Joint Readiness Training Center demonstrate that many SF battalions are not prepared to execute base defense tasks without the assistance of other forces. Many SF commanders do not consider base defense a mission essential task and the result is a lack of training by many of their personnel.This study analyzes joint and SF doctrine, observations from the field, and the effects of the contemporary operating environment to identify weaknesses in the readiness of SF battalions.By The Honorable Dan A. Kimball, Admiral Raymond A. Spruance, Rear Adm. Worrall Reed Carter. 2015
Includes over 150 photos.Victory is won or lost in battle, but all military history shows that adequate logistic support is…
essential to the winning of battles.In World War II, logistic support of the fleet in the Pacific became a problem of such magnitude and diversity, as well as vital necessity, that all operations against Japan hinged upon it. The advance against the enemy moved our fleet progressively farther and farther away from the west coast of the United States, from Pearl Harbor, and from other sources of supply, to support our fleet we constructed temporary bases for various uses, and we formed floating mobile service squadrons and other logistic support groups. These floating organizations remained near the fighting fleet, supplying food, ammunition, and other necessities while rendering repair services close to the combat areas, this support enabled the fleet to keep unrelenting pressure upon the enemy by obviating the return of the fleet to home bases.Because of the knowledge gained during his South Pacific service and particularly from his experience as Commander of Service Squadron Ten, the largest of the mobile squadrons, Rear Admiral W.R. Carter was chosen to write this history of logistics afloat in the Pacific. The opinions expressed and the conclusions reached are those of the author.- Secretary of the Navy, Dan KimballBy Major William W. Hamilton. 2015
One of German General Carl Von Clausewitz's key concepts is culmination. His primary work On War describes culmination for the…
attacker as the point beyond which he can no longer continue his attack and risks destruction from a counterattack. For the defender it is the point beyond which the defender gains no more advantages by continuing his defense. At this point the defender must decide to act. Clausewitz envisioned that at this point the defender would release his flashing sword of vengeance and counterattack. Clausewitz developed the concept of culmination for what we regard today as the strategic and operational levels of war. This paper seeks to answer the question, Does the concept of defensive culmination apply at the tactical level and can the tactical defender use it to determine when to counterattack?This paper uses three historical examples to examine when and how commanders executed tactical counterattacks. The examples are used to evaluate a theoretical framework of Clausewitz's defensive concepts. The criteria used to evaluate the historical cases are: defensive preparation, terrain, availability of intelligence on the attacker, timing for the defender and attacker, determination of the defender's defeat mechanism, depth of the defense, type of counterattack, the timing of the counterattack, and condition of the attacker and defender when the counterattack was executed. The key concepts examined are culmination and counterattack timing.