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Significance Of The Human Being As An Element In An Information System: WWII Forward Air Controllers And Close Air Support
By Lieutenant Jamie W. Achée USN. 2014
This research will explore the relevance of the human being as an element in an information system. The purpose of…
this study is to analyze the influence technology, especially information technology, has had on the way human beings understand and use information systems. This study will look at the use of forward air controllers and close air support in the European Theater of Operations during WWII and evaluate the technology, the doctrine and the people involved as they related to the forward air control-close air support information system. Other areas that will be discussed as they relate to the development of close air support include: incremental vs. radical change, organizational culture and change, and the dynamic nature of current and future operations as they relate to information systems.The primary research objective is to explore the answer to the following question: Based on the role of forward air controller in the European Theater of Operations during World War Two, what is the significance of the human being as an element in an information system? Secondary questions include: What are the necessary elements that make up an information system? How and where were forward air controllers used and were they effective? What were the information systems used by the forward air controllers and were they effective? Last, what implications do the findings of this research have for current technologies, organizational structure and the interaction between human beings and information systems in U.S. military operations?No Heroic Battles: Lessons Of The Second Lebanon War
By Lt -Col Brian J Murphy. 2014
On July 12, 2006, Israel went to war with Hezbollah in response to the killing and capture of Israeli soldiers…
along the southern Lebanese border. Believed at the time by many in the West to be an overreaction to a relatively minor border incident resulted in hundreds of civilian deaths in Lebanon, the displacement of hundreds of thousands of civilians on both sides of the border, and the deaths of dozens of Israeli soldiers and civilians. More important to Israeli nation security, the war exposed basic flaws in Israel's national security assumptions, and defense strategy.This study reveals that Israel went to war without having clearly defined its critical political, diplomatic, or military goals and objectives. In the years immediately prior to the beginning of the war the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) rejected the long proven principles of war in favor of a novel, incoherent, and confusing doctrine. The war revealed the debilitating impact of a long counterinsurgency campaign on training, and traditional combined arms capabilities. Finally, despite the superb performance of the Israeli Air Force (IAF), airpower and technology proved to be inconclusive and a poor substitute for well-trained resolute maneuver forces directly engaging enemy forces.A Campaign Of Ropes: An Analysis Of The Duke Of Wellington’s Practice Of Military Art During The Peninsular War, 1808 To 1814
By Major J. Kevin Hendrick. 2014
The purpose of this paper was to study the practice of military art at the operational level of war. The…
story of Wellington's ultimate success against Napoleon's Marshals was selected as a case study as it seemed rich in the application of mental agility to achieve an asymmetrical military advantage in a theater of war. As military theory recognizes two general types of military art, classical strategy and operational art, the research question was constructed to determine if Wellington practiced pure classic strategy, or an early/transitional form of operational art.In order to provide a basis of analysis, the essential elements of both classic strategy and operational art are next defined. The history of classic strategy is outlined, then the theory of Clausewitz and Jomini used to define its four basic elements. The practice of operational art is then traced, from its inception by U.S. Grant during the American Civil War, to Soviet operational theory developed in the 1920's. The theory of Dr. James Schneider, a primary interpreter of both Grant and the Soviets, provides the eight essential elements of operational art. To round out the section on military art, U.S. operational doctrine is outlined and discussed.Like most military officers, Wellington was a creature of his own experience, therefore a chapter is dedicated to the lessons he learned as a young officer in India. The following chapter is dedicated to a study of the Peninsular War. As the research question deals with both the operational and strategic levels of war, Wellington's tactics are neglected in favor of his campaign concepts and execution.Battle Of Mogadishu: Anatomy Of A Failure
By Major Roger N Sangvic. 2014
By applying Cohen and Gooch's model to the Battle of Mogadishu, this paper shows that the failure of the TFR…
mission on 3-4 October 1993 was the result of a system failure. Secretary Aspin received far more blame than he deserved for making the decision. Misperception of the real impact tanks and APCs could have had on the overall mission is the real cause of this disproportionate blame. GEN Hoar and GEN Powell, in addition, bear as much responsibility as Secretary Aspin for the decision. Neither of these generals strongly advocated the deployment to Aspin even though the worsening situation on the ground merited their strong support. Both Hoar and Powell's approval recommendations can be characterized as lukewarm. Aspin's real failure was of not being more critical of the conduct of the TFR operations. In light of Secretary Aspin's acknowledged concern over the number of similar operations conducted by TFR and his knowledge that the Administration was seeking a political solution, he should have notified MG Garrison of the policy shift though the JCS and CINCCENT and provided additional guidance on risk. Had Aspin either reassessed the risk of each TFR operation more thoroughly or done a better job coordinating the policy shift in light of the increased risks, it is likely that the three October raid would not have occurred.Efficacy Of Urban Insurgency In The Modern Era
By Major Thomas Erik Miller. 2014
Insurgency is one of the oldest and most prevalent forms of warfare. The last fifty years have seen the increase…
in the numbers and intensity of insurgencies worldwide, particularly in urban insurgencies. Global trends of virtually unconstrained population growth and urbanization (particularly in underdeveloped countries), globalization and the information revolution create conducive environments for urban insurgency.The approach taken in this thesis is to examine three exemplar case studies to determine causation in the outcome of the urban insurgencies, their purposes, differences in technique between rural and urban insurgency, the advantages and disadvantages of the urban insurgent, and whether these advantages were capitalized upon in order to determine the feasibility of urban insurgency in the modern era. The case studies examined were the Battle of Algiers from 1956 to 1957, Uruguay from 1962 to 1972, and Northern Ireland from 1969 to 1974.The conclusion of this work is the feasibility of modern urban insurgency. Urban insurgents will apply modern technologies to enhance their security, use discriminate targeting, especially in economic targeting, and skillfully conduct information operations in exploitation of the media and technologies for dissemination. Counterinsurgents must win the information war and execute a coherent strategy addressing the underlying cause of insurgency to prevail.Analysis Of The Six Day War, June 1967
By Major Charles B. Long USAF. 2014
This paper examines the Six Day War, the Arab-Israeli conflict of 1967, for the purposes of highlighting applications/violations of the…
principles of war outlined in AFM 1-1. This material will be incorporated into an AGSC block of instruction studying the principles of war as used in famous historical battles. This paper is divided into three separate sections. The first section reviews the background of the Arab-Israeli problem and highlights some of the major events leading up to the war. This section also presents a battle synopsis of the conflict including visual depictions of the battle progress. The second section provides an analysis of the use (or misuse) of the principles of war by each side--Arab and Israeli. The final section provides some discussion questions, with supporting rationale, in a guided discussion format for possible use in a seminar environment. The non-standard format for this project is at the request of ACSC/EDCJ to assist in building this particular block of instruction.Air Power And The Ground War In Vietnam, Ideas And Actions: Ideas And Actions
By Donald J. Mrozek. 2014
Ultimately, this study is about a smaller Vietnam War than that which is commonly recalled. It focuses on expectations concerning…
the impact of air power on the ground war and on some of its actual effects, but it avoids major treatment of some of the most dramatic air actions of the war, such as the bombing of Hanoi. To many who fought the war and believe it ought to have been conducted on a still larger scale or with fewer restraints, this study may seem almost perverse, emphasizing as it does the utility of air power in conducting the conflict as a ground war and without total exploitation of our most awe-inspiring technology.Although the chapters in this study are intended to form a coherent and unified argument, each also offers discrete messages. The chapters are not meant to be definitive. They do not exhaust available documentary material, and they often rely heavily on published accounts. Nor do they provide a complete chronological picture of the uses of air power, even with respect to the ground war. Nor is coverage of areas in which air power was employed--South Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, and North Vietnam--evenly distributed nor necessarily proportionate to the effort expended in each place during the war. Lastly, some may find one or another form of air power either slightly or insufficiently treated. Such criticisms are beside the point, for the objectives of this study are to explore a comparatively neglected theme--the impact of air power on the ground--and to encourage further utilization of lessons drawn from the Vietnam experience.The Generalship Of General Henri E. Navarre During The Battle Of Dien Bien Phu
By Major Bruce H. Hupe. 2014
This study examines the generalship of the French Commander-in-Chief in Indochina, General Henri E. Navarre, during the battle of Dien…
Bien Phu in 1954. This thesis employs a model of generalship from the United States Army doctrinal publication, Field Manual 22-103, Leadership and Command at Senior Levels, to analyse the actions of General Navarre. Through the application of the model, this thesis tests whether American doctrine supports or refutes the judgment of history. The conclusion reached is that the defeat of the French forces at the battle of Dien Bien Phu was largely due to a failure of senior level leadership on the part of General Henri E. Navarre.Failure In Independent Tactical Command: Napoleon’s Marshals In 1813
By Major John M Keefe. 2014
This monograph offers a new perspective on an old subject. That is why did Napoleon's marshals, so successful in corps…
command, fail when given an independent army command? It examines in detail the defeats of Marshal Nicolas Charles Oudinot at Gross Beeren, Marshal Etienne MacDonald at Katzbach, and Marshal Michel Ney at Dennewitz.Many authors have speculated why these marshals failed in independent tactical command. They have offered such reasons as lack of talent, lack of guidance from Napoleon or the failure to understand the nature of Napoleonic warfare. While these reasons are valid, they are contributing factors rather than the primary reason for the failure of napoleon's marshals.A thorough analysis of Napoleon's Correspondences for the period 10 August through 8 September 1813 reveals that Napoleon did provide adequate guidance to his subordinate commanders. A detailed study of the actions of all three marshals in both movement to and conduct during battle reveals that they in fact understood the nature of Napoleonic warfare. Certainly lack of talent was not the problem as each had been very successful in combat for twenty-two years. The primary reason that these marshals failed was their inability to command and control their forces. Lack of adequate staffs and an inability to make the intellectual leap from corps to army command proved to be their downfall.Bush War: The Use of Surrogates in Southern Africa (1975-1989)
By Major Joseph E Escandon U S Army. 2014
The purpose of this monograph is to examine the use of indigenous surrogates by both the Republic of South Africa…
and Rhodesia in Southern Africa's Bush Wars from 1975 to 1989. The Bush Wars are of significance because the use of surrogates in each case represents policy and doctrine that is outside of the United States military's traditional understanding and employment of surrogates.The methodology of this paper is to analyze two unique surrogate forces to determine if they significantly contributed to the accomplishment of strategic aims and operational objectives. Such an examination is relevant because current U.S. policy and strategy advocates building the capacity of foreign security forces, as well as the use of irregular surrogate forces, to achieve U.S. foreign policy objectives.Given the political and military challenges of Iraq and Afghanistan, policymakers believe that the United States can ill afford another long-duration, resource intensive, politically charged counterinsurgency campaign. The use of surrogates offers the promise of low-visibility, economy of force operations. Nonetheless, enthusiasm for the use of surrogates must be tempered by the reality that surrogates are not a substitute for effective operational art and strategy.Into The Beehive - The Somali Habr Gidr Clan As An Adaptive Enemy
By Major Mark F. Duffield USAF. 2014
On October 3rd 1993, US efforts in Somalia culminated as the result of an overnight battle that cost eighteen American…
lives and effectively silenced all optimism that Somalia could be externally resurrected as a functioning state. What began as a humanitarian mission to abate starvation had evolved into the absurdity of outright combat against the very people meant to be saved. Beyond the issues of political policy, lurks a disturbing fact that remains unaddressed by the US military. Out of the anarchy that was Somalia in 1993--and is like many other places where US forces may be, committed--an untrained, ill-equipped, and undisciplined enemy quickly adapted their tactics, invalidated key US planning assumptions, and evolved into a lethal force. The Habr Gidr's tactical adaptation outpaced the planning efforts of elite US units and achieved their tactical, operational and strategic goals at US expense.This monograph explores how this adaptation occurred. It goes beyond the common theories concerning equipment, tactics, and the inherent difficulties of combined operations to look at the very nature of adaptation itself. It provides a different view of events in Somalia in hopes of better informing military planners facing a similar opponent. At its heart, this monograph explores the possibility that what appeared to be little more than an anarchic mob may have been a functioning complex adaptive system.Urban Operations, Untrained On Terrain
By Major Paul S. Burton. 2014
This thesis traces the development of urban operations from World War II to the present to examine the evolution of…
doctrine, training, organization, and equipment. Four specific operations/battles are examined, including Stalingrad in World War II on the eastern front, Belfast in Northern Ireland from 1968 to the present, Beirut in Lebanon in 1982, and an illustrative future model in Seoul in Korea in 2012.The historical examples are compared to the U.S. scenario in Seoul, Korea, in 2012 to determine similarities and differences. Future lessons learned are extrapolated from these similarities and differences.The study concludes that the U.S. Army has weaknesses in doctrine, training, organization, and equipment in war and military operations other than war at the tactical and operational levels. This study recommends an updated, integrated doctrine, a training facility and training plans at the unit level, a more flexible organization, and procurement of new equipment.An Invisible Scalpel: Low-Visibility Operations in the War on Terror
By Charles R V O Quinn. 2014
The War on Terror (WOT) is actually a war against extremist insurgents comprised of numerous and varied organizations scattered across…
the globe. They are spurred to action by an extremist ideology that is nurtured, demonstrated, and led by al Qaeda and its leadership. This ideology serves as the insurgency's center of gravity whereby it gains all manner of support across a broad spectrum of functional resources in multiple operational domains. As operating environments change, these ideology inspired decentralized insurgent organizations are able to quickly adapt their methods of operation. In order to defeat this evolving, ubiquitous yet elusive threat, the US must develop a comprehensive strategy that incorporates all instruments of US national power, as well as those of its allies. This strategy must also defeat or mitigate the enemy's center of gravity in order to have any chance of success. This thesis argues that as lead combatant command in the WOT, the US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) should conduct continuous, global, pre-emptive low-visibility operations in order to disrupt insurgent operations. In order to accomplish its WOT missions, USSOCOM must effectively organize and array forces and resources to defeat insurgent functional resources across multiple operational domains.Combat Failure: Nightmare of Armored Units Since World War II
By Major William R Moyer. 2014
This monograph examines the relationship between physical forces prevalent on the modern battlefield and the causes inherent to US armored…
battalion failure since World War II. Given the complexity of today's battlefield in terms of technology, command and control, and lethality, examining the physical aspects of failure can offer the clearest understanding of unit failure as a whole; after all, physical actions and reactions in battle are more easily analyzed.To determine the relationship between armored failure and physical forces on the battlefield, I first provide some theoretical and contemporary perspectives on the physical aspects of unit failure. Next, the causes and conditions of battlefield failure are identified and examined, followed by a discussion of the processes of failure. After laying a foundation of theory and the processes of failure, historical examples as well as recent armored NTC experiences are examined to determine the decisive causes of failure for US armor units since World War II.My conclusion is that effective enemy maneuver, when complimented with overwhelming fires is the decisive cause of failure for US armored units since World War II. Maneuver sets the conditions for both physical and moral destruction. However, failure is difficult to isolate; it is complex and occurs most often because of a combination of actions rarely just one. Clearly, technology has a great deal to do with physical failure. Maneuver, firepower, and protection have increased the power and importance of physical forces in relation to moral and cybernetic forces. Ultimately, overwhelming enemy maneuver and fires rapidly destroy unit cohesion as well as the physical capabilities of the defeated unit.The British Colonial Experience In Waziristan And Its Applicability To Current Operations
By Matthew Williams. 2014
Following the fall of the Taliban government in Afghanistan in late 2001, members of the former regime and Al-Qaeda found…
refuge in Waziristan. Waziristan is a tribal area in Pakistan located along the border with Afghanistan whose majority ethnic Pashtun population has menaced every occupying power since Alexander the Great. The formidable terrain coupled with the fierce independent character of the Pashtun tribes has made Waziristan a difficult area for outsiders to subdue. Taliban and Al-Qaeda elements use this tribal area as a sanctuary and staging area for attacks against international and government forces in Afghanistan. Waziristan is especially important to the U.S. due to the belief that sympathetic tribesmen may be sheltering Osama bin Ladin and his key lieutenants.Due to the fact that Waziristan is part of a sovereign country that has forbidden the permanent presence of U.S. troops, the U.S. cannot directly influence this area with overt, uniformed military forces. Despite this challenge, the U.S. is not the first country to try to influence events in Waziristan. When developing the best course of action to accomplish its goals in Waziristan, the U.S. can look to the British colonial experience to help guide its actions. The British dealt extensively with Waziristan from 1849-1947. Despite the passage of time, the most important factors (i.e., political, military, geographical, and ethnographical, etc.) that influenced the British colonial experience have not changed significantly and are still relevant today.Lessons Learned From Advising And Training The Republic Of South Vietnam’s Armed Forces
By Major Thomas E. Clinton Jr. USMC. 2014
The United States (US) has a long history of employing military advisors, from the American military occupation of the Philippines…
throughout the 19th century, and the Korea War in the 1950s, the Vietnam War 1950 to 1973, El Salvador 1984 to 1992, to current efforts in Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). A strong Iraqi military is needed to support the future democratic government of Iraq. This will allow the US to disengage a large portion of its combat units from Iraq. The US must train the present Iraqi military to successfully take over responsibility for Iraq's security and combat the current insurgency. The US Army and Marine Corps combat advisors will play a key role in ensuring the Iraqi military is properly organized, trained, and equipped to provide for a secure Iraq. There are lessons learned from training and advising the Republic of South Vietnam's Armed Forces (RVNAF) during the Vietnam War 1950 to 1973 that could be applied in the ongoing advisory effort in Iraq. The focus of this thesis is to determine the lessons learned from selecting, training, and the organization of US Army and Marine Corps advisors during the Vietnam War.The Iberian Leech: Napoleon’s Counterinsurgency Operations In The Peninsula, 1807-1810
By Major Mark A Reeves. 2014
By 1807, Napoleon's victories over his European adversaries were legendary. His Grand Army had defeated the greatest European armies of…
the period. Each army, in succession, from the Hapsburg Empire to Russia, had been soundly beaten and had not been able to come to grips with how to deal with his lightning style of warfare. Yet, over a six-year period from 1807 to 1813, in the backwater Iberian Peninsula, Napoleon lost both his prestige and more troops than he lost in the infamous wintry campaign in Russia. How did an army of bandits, priests, and commoners along with a small expeditionary force achieve victory over the most powerful armies on the continent? The answer lies in that Napoleon did not only fight a band of insurgents and a small British led coalition army, but he also suffered from a combination of poor morale, weak leadership and a refusal to fully recognize the enemy situation. His overextended lines of communications covered an area that was bleak and poor in resources and he could no longer rely on foraging to feed and supply his troops, many of them suffering from starvation.The Iberian Campaign cost Napoleon over 250,000 troops and drained the French of manpower and resources that could have been used elsewhere. The campaign bankrupt Napoleon's image of invincibility and sapped his armies' leadership and experience. Therefore, Napoleon would have to rely on more conscripts and an ever-increasing number of foreign troops to fill his depleted ranks. Napoleon's generals were entangled in a politico-military quagmire for which they were never prepared and for which they received little guidance. The Peninsular Campaign sucked the lifeblood of Napoleon's armies and they were never able to fully recover from it.German Northern Theater of Operations 1940-1945 [Illustrated Edition]
By Earl Ziemke. 2014
[Includes 23 maps and 31 illustrations]This volume describes two campaigns that the Germans conducted in their Northern Theater of Operations.…
The first they launched, on 9 April 1940, against Denmark and Norway. The second they conducted out of Finland in partnership with the Finns against the Soviet Union. The latter campaign began on 22 June 1941 and ended in the winter of 1944-45 after the Finnish Government had sued for peace.The scene of these campaigns by the end of 1941 stretched from the North Sea to the Arctic Ocean and from Bergen on the west coast of Norway, to Petrozavodsk, the former capital of the Karelo-Finnish Soviet Socialist Republic. It faced east into the Soviet Union on a 700-mile-long front, and west on a 1,300-mile sea frontier. Hitler regarded this theater as the keystone of his empire, and, after 1941, maintained in it two armies totaling over a half million men.In spite of its vast area and the effort and worry which Hitler lavished on it, the Northern Theater throughout most of the war constituted something of a military backwater. The major operations which took place in the theater were overshadowed by events on other fronts, and public attention focused on the theaters in which the strategically decisive operations were expected to take place. Remoteness, German security measures, and the Russians' well-known penchant for secrecy combined to keep information concerning the Northern Theater down to a mere trickle, much of that inaccurate. Since the war, through official and private publications, a great deal more has become known. The present volume is based in the main on the greatest remaining source of unexploited information, the captured German military and naval records. In addition a number of the participants on the German side have very generously contributed from their personal knowledge and experience.Clausewitz And Seapower: Lessons Of The Falkland Islands War
By LCDR Edward B Zellem USN. 2014
This paper explores the hypothesis that although Clausewitz has been criticized for not specifically addressing naval warfare in his seminal…
work On War, Clausewitzian principles are in fact not only applicable, but highly relevant to the modern conduct of war at sea. The 1982 Falkland Islands conflict between Great Britain and Argentina will be used as the framework to examine this hypothesis. As the largest and most significant series of naval engagements since World War II, the Falklands War provides a rich database of both traditional and non-traditional lessons learned about the conduct of war at sea. This paper begins with a brief discussion of critiques of Clausewitz and his apparent lack of focus on the naval element of warfare. It will be followed by a historical review of significant events leading up to, and during the Falkland Islands War. Key events in the war will then be reviewed and examined within a framework of Clausewitzian principles. The motives, key assumptions, military strategy, and tactics of Great Britain and Argentina will be discussed within the context of the Clausewitzian dictum that war is the continuation of politics by other means. Selected specific events in the campaign will then be addressed in terms of Clausewitzian principles of war to determine their relevance or irrelevance to modern naval strategy and campaigning.Combining Concepts: Operational Shock In Insurgencies
By Major Ryan J Bulger. 2014
The focus of this work is to ascertain whether the concept of operational shock, which has served as the intellectual…
underpinning of the US Army's doctrine over the past thirty years, can be used to guide an operational approach in a counterinsurgency campaign. The concept of operational shock sits at the foundation of much of United States Army's operational doctrine. The American way of war now focuses not on the destruction of an enemy's equipment and personnel, but on degrading and disrupting his ability to continue to fight.Much of counterinsurgency doctrine and theory does not fit this operational logic. The previous decade of war has led to a renewed debate both in public and inside the national security apparatus of the United States. With the publication of Field Manual 3-24: Counterinsurgency, the United States produced its first doctrine dedicated to countering insurgency in over twenty years. The logic within FM 3-24 dictates that if the counterinsurgent can dissolve the conditions that enabled the existence of the insurgency, the governmental forces can change the logic of the population.