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Special Forces Command And Control In Afghanistan
By Major Richard G. Rhyne. 2015
The purpose of this study is to examine the nature of the command and control relationship between Special Forces and…
conventional forces. Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan serves as a case study in practice and doctrinal application. Against the backdrop of World War II, Operations in Panama, Haiti, Somalia, Bosnia, and Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, this thesis provides an analysis of the complex issues arising from the necessity to fight jointly.Soviet Actions In Afghanistan And Initiative At The Tactical Level: Are There Implications For The US Army?
By Major John D Frketic. 2015
This monograph examines the Soviet experience in Afghanistan (1979-1988) in terms of Soviet Army tactics and organization for combat. Throughout…
the decade of the 1970's, U.S. perceptions of Soviet ground force tactics stressed a general lack of initiative and flexibility in their military doctrine. In the 1980's a re-evaluation of Soviet thinking occurred which saw greater flexibility at the operational and strategic levels If the experience in Afghanistan has shown that set-piece tactics will not work in all types of warfare, and the Soviets are able to incorporate higher levels of initiative and flexibility into their tactical doctrine, then the U.S. may be required to refocus its training away from the stylized Soviet enemy.This study begins with a background discussion of Soviet historical involvement in Afghanistan to include counter-insurgency experience in their southwestern border area. It then covers the actual invasion and units employed with emphasis on their pre-deployment status and subsequent performance. The following section divides the war into four phases to ease understanding. The monograph subsequently looks at lessons learned and principles reaffirmed from both the Soviet and U.S. perspective. A key feature is the need the Soviets apparently feel for Western style initiative and flexibility at lower command levels (battalion, company and platoon), and how this is inconsistent with their culture and system of command and control.Reevaluation Of Pemberton At Vicksburg
By Major Malcolm G. Haynes. 2015
Historians have largely agreed that Pemberton should shoulder the blame for the poor Confederate performance during the Vicksburg campaign. General…
consensus exists among American Civil War historians that Pemberton proved a confused, indecisive, and incompetent commander and his poor leadership led to the Confederate defeat. However, an examination of the Vicksburg campaign conducted at the operational level of war shows that throughout the campaign, Pemberton led a capable and competent defense not just of Vicksburg, but of the Mississippi Department he commanded. He relied on an operational approach that involved fighting from prepared defensive positions in favorable terrain deep in his own territory and anchored by natural obstacles. To attack such a position, Pemberton knew an opponent would need a large force operating over an extended line of communications (LOC). Pemberton intended to interdict his opponent's LOC using a strong cavalry force, thus preventing the enemy from achieving the offensive momentum necessary to break through Vicksburg's defenses. This was a sound operational approach. However, it failed because of an ineffective Confederate command structure that, among other failures, denied Pemberton the resources, particularly adequate cavalry forces, required to implement his operational approach.General Walton H. Walker: A Talent For Training
By Major Adam W Hilburgh. 2015
A study of General Walton H. Walker's career offers a lens through which to view the evolution of Army training…
doctrine, revealing its strengths and weaknesses over a period of nearly four decades. However, an understanding of the skills necessary to train units for combat cannot consist solely of a review of training doctrine. General Walker's career provides valuable insights into the real-world challenges a leader experienced training an Army unit, both in war and in peacetime. The resource constraints, political realities, and physical hardships that make Army training so difficult to accomplish with skill and foresight cannot be gleaned from classroom lectures or the pages of a journal or doctrinal publication. Further, an analysis of the breakout and pursuit Walker's XX Corps executed in Normandy, and later the performance of the Eighth Army during the first weeks of combat in Korea, reveal how General Walker applied contemporary training principles to develop combat formations that performed exceptionally well in combat. Finally, a review of current training principles demonstrates that Walker emphasized the same principles throughout his career that retain primacy in today's Army. This reveals Walker's lasting legacy: in addition to performing among the best of the Army's commanders in combat, Walker set himself apart as one of the leading trainers in U.S. Army history.Shiloh: A Case Study In Surprise
By Major William J McCaffrey. 2015
The commander must remain ever vigilant against surprise, for attacks born of the unexpected have the potential to alter quickly…
and irreversibly the relative combat power of opposing forces. A commander is better prepared to meet this threat when he is familiar with those factors which have contributed to surprise during past conflicts. This thesis investigates the surprise phenomenon through a case study of the battle at Shiloh Church.General Ulysses S. Grant, during the American Civil War, bivouacked his army near Shiloh Church on the Tennessee River's west bank while he awaited General Don Carlos Buell and the Army of the Ohio. On Buell's arrival the combined armies were to attack Corinth, Mississippi, where the Confederate forces under General Albert Sidney Johnston were known to be entrenched. Realizing the combined strength of the two Union armies would eventually prove overwhelming, Johnston decided to attack Grant's position before Buell could reinforce. He therefore attacked early Sunday morning, 6 April 1862. Apparently unaware that an attack was imminent, Grant had encamped his army with little regard for defense. The Confederates enjoyed success and forced the Union army against the Tennessee River. However, Buell reinforced Grant that evening, and on the following day the Union armies counterattacked and drove the Confederates back toward Corinth. Thus, the battle ended on a rather indecisive note.Among the more important conclusions of the thesis are:1. Although the Union forces below division level anticipated the Confederate attack. Grant and his command echelon were completely surprised.2. Surprise was achieved because the Union had violated several principles of war, chiefly: objective, offensive, maneuver, unity of command, and security.3. The Confederates were not without fault, for, had certain mistakes been avoided, their army might have won a total victory.A Special Force: Origin And Development Of The Jedburgh Project In Support Of Operation Overlord
By Major Wyman W Irwin. 2015
This study examines the history of the Jedburgh project from the origin of the concept, through development of the Jedburgh…
plan, to final preparations for deployment. It includes a study of the recruitment process used to man the force and the training program undertaken to prepare the Jedburghs for their unconventional warfare (UW) mission.The Jedburgh plan provided for 100 three-man teams composed of American, British, French, Belgian, and Dutch special forces personnel. These teams operated well behind German lines, with the primary mission of coordinating the activities of the various resistance elements to ensure that their operations supported the overall Allied campaign effort.These operations, indeed the very concept of a force designed to work directly with partisans in an occupied country in support of conventional forces, remain significant because they are the doctrinal basis for our current special forces. Today's UW doctrine centers increasingly around the support of revolutionary insurgents in a low intensity conflict environment. U.S. Army Special Forces leaders must understand the different and complex nature of conducting UW with partisans in a mid to high intensity conflict, though, if they are to remain prepared to conduct these operations. The amount of lead time required to develop such a capability will probably not be available in future conflicts.Impact Of German Military Resistance Movements Upon Field Commanders Of The German Army, 1933-1944
By Major George D. Hardesty. 2015
A revolutionary tradition did not exist in the Imperial German Army. But during the years 1918-1944 events occurred which produced…
such an impact on the moral fibre of the German Officer Corps that eventually a few of them participated in a conspiracy against Hitler. This work seeks only to throw light on those aspects of German military history that portray the gradual disintegration of the monolithic structure of the German Army that occurred prior to 20 July 1944.The study has been divided into four major parts: the revolutionary days following the defeat of World War I, 1918-1920; the development of the Reichswehr and the rise to power of Hitler, 1920-1933; the transition from Reichswehr to Wehrmacht, 1933-1938; and the period of active opposition to Hitler, 1938-1944. The analysis, generally, follows a chronological course, and results in an examination of those events which influenced the German officers who were the field commanders of World War II.In this tragedy, it would appear that the German Officer Corps was less to blame for its actions--or lack of action within the broader framework of the German nation--than has often been believed to be the case, primarily because the actions of the officers were often the result of factors beyond the control of soldiers. Such a conclusion may be at variance with that of other writers on the subject. The weight of evidence examined, however, will not support a different conclusion, particularly when one analyzes the conduct of tactical units at Field Army and lower echelons of command.In this century the soldiers of the German Army have undergone two severe tests. It remains only for history to establish the answer to this question: Has this been the German Army's guilt or the German Army's fate?SUN-SAND AND SURVIVAL - An Analysis Of Survival Experiences In Desert Areas
By Richard A. Howard. 2015
Desert survival presents unique problems not met in other non-temperate areas. Recognizing this, the Arctic, Desert, Tropic Information Center commissioned…
Dr. Richard A. Howard to assemble and analyze desert survival experiences of World War II, for the purpose of increasing our knowledge of desert survival techniques and procedures. To know what World War II survivors did, what they thought, and what they recommended after having experienced desert survival conditions is of paramount importance. Sun, Sand and Survival relates and evaluates these experiences.Dr. Howard, ADTIC consultant, has had long experience in the survival training of military personnel. He is the author of the ADTIC Publication T-100 999 Survived which analyzes 1,000 tropical survival experiences. Dr. Howard's desert study analyzes 382 successful desert survival episodes and mention is made of an additional 142 individuals who were lost. The stories show how men without desert background or mental conditioning met their desert problems. They include examples of men who left their group and were never heard of again. In the light of our present knowledge of the water requirements of the human body, we know that many could have survived had they had a better understanding of the requirements imposed by the desert. More survivors would have returned in better health and endured less discomfort if advance knowledge had been readily available.C.S. Lewis on Politics and the Natural Law
By Justin Buckley Dyer, Micah J. Watson. 2016
Conventional wisdom holds that C. S. Lewis was uninterested in politics and public affairs. The conventional wisdom is wrong. As…
Justin Buckley Dyer and Micah J. Watson show in this groundbreaking work, Lewis was deeply interested in the fundamental truths and falsehoods about human nature and how these conceptions manifest themselves in the contested and turbulent public square. Ranging from the depths of Lewis' philosophical treatments of epistemology and moral pedagogy to practical considerations of morals legislation and responsible citizenship, this book explores the contours of Lewis' multi-faceted Christian engagement with political philosophy generally and the natural-law tradition in particular. Drawing from the full range of Lewis' corpus and situating his thought in relationship to both ancient and modern seminal thinkers, C. S. Lewis on Politics and the Natural Law offers an unprecedented look at politics and political thought from the perspective of one of the twentieth century's most influential writers.Patrick R. Cleburne And The Tactical Employment Of His Division At The Battle Of Chickamauga
By Major Joseph M. Lance III USMC. 2015
This study is a historical analysis of Major General Patrick R. Cleburne's Division during the Battle of Chickamauga. Cleburne's Division…
earned a reputation as one of the best divisions in either army. This reputation also carried with it lofty expectations. This study analyzes how Cleburne's Division performed at Chickamauga and what the effects of its actions were on the overall outcome of the battle.The Battle of Chickamauga has suffered its share of historical neglect. Fought in the forests and mountains of northern Georgia and southeastern Tennessee, the battle has not been immortalized by any stirring fictional works, nor has it inspired any feature films, but the story of the men who fought there is worth studying.Cleburne's Division did not distinguish itself at Chickamauga. It launched a confused, disjointed night attack to close out the first day of the battle, but determined leaders succeed in capturing their objectives. Day two of the battle saw Cleburne's Division attack four hours late. It was quickly repulsed while suffering horrific casualties. While the Confederate left wing routed the Union Army, Cleburne's Division nursed their wounds before finally advancing at sunset, as the Union withdrew from the battlefield.Important Differences Between Successful And Unsuccessful Senior Allied Army Combat Leaders
By F. Earl Morrison. 2015
Two successful and two unsuccessful senior Allied Army combat leaders are studied to discern whether there are important differences in…
the qualities and abilities, they demonstrated in combat. The methodology used was to examine materials on the leaders for examples demonstrating courage, determination, coup d'œil, presence of mind, strength of will, and sense of locality--qualities and abilities which Carl von Clausewitz thought important. Any other qualities or abilities which appeared important in the cases studied were also noted. The study, however, represents an initial exploratory look. It is qualitative and judgmental, not quantitative and empirical. It was found that the successful leaders demonstrated a balance of qualities and abilities while the unsuccessful ones either lacked a balance or demonstrated some fatal flaw. Further study by other researchers is recommended.Marine Close Air Support In World War II
By Major Brian S. McFadden. 2015
This paper traces the development of close air support (CAS) by the United States Marine Corps in World War II.…
The study examines how the Marines started developing their doctrine in the 1930s and adapted their (CAS) system based on the outcome of battles on Guadalcanal, Tarawa, Iwo Jima, and Okinawa, as well as during operations in support of the U.S. Army in the Philippines. Particular emphasis is placed on the development of Marine CAS doctrine, liaison organizational structures, aircraft, and air-to-ground weapons. This study is pertinent because it describes how the Marines developed a very effective weapon that greatly increased the potency of its amphibious operations. Additionally, this was initially accomplished during a period of very limited financial resources (before the start of World War II) and then limited time resources (during the war crisis). This study also shows how the Marines worked to support the forces on the ground with the best CAS system possible despite the opposition.How The North Vietnamese Won The War: Operational Art Bends But Does Not Break In Response To Asymmetry
By Major Dale S Ringler. 2015
This monograph analyzes the effectiveness of operational campaign design against an asymmetrical threat during the 1968 Tet Offensive. The focus…
is on conceptual elements of campaign design that are derived from theory, which incorporate the particulars of military history to the general truth of warfare. Effective campaign execution is dependent, in part, on effective campaign design that set of theoretical and doctrinal precepts that define the concerns of the operational planner. The monograph identifies lessons learned from this period that are applicable to current U.S. Joint and Army doctrine as well as lessons for planners and executors of U.S. military action under the American system of civilian control of the military.First, the monograph demonstrated the complex nature of asymmetric warfare. Finding and creating vulnerabilities and attacking those vulnerabilities with inherent strengths is the key to asymmetric warfare. Secondly, the monograph discussed the elements of campaign design that are derived from theory, which incorporate the particulars of military history to the general truth of warfare. Some of the more common conceptual actions are to understand the type and scope of conflict, define the enemy and friendly center of gravity, identify possible culminating points, select lines of operation, determine decisive points, and understanding the dangers of paralysis commonly known as cyber shock. The third section identifies the strategy and identifies particular military objectives identified by the North Vietnamese.Thinking about Free Will
By Peter Van Inwagen. 2017
Peter van Inwagen, author of the classic book An Essay on Free Will (1983), has established himself over the last…
forty years as a leading figure in the philosophical debate about the problem of free will. This volume presents eleven influential essays from throughout his career, as well as two new and previously unpublished essays, 'The Problem of Fr** W*ll' and 'Ability'. The essays include discussions of determinism, moral responsibility, 'Frankfurt counterexamples', the meaning of 'the ability to do otherwise', and the very definition of free will, as well as critiques of writings on the topic by Daniel Dennett and David Lewis. An introduction by the author discusses the history of his thinking about free will. The volume will be a valuable resource for those looking to engage with van Inwagen's significant contributions to this perennially important topic.Seeking Shadows In The Sky: The Strategy Of Air Guerrilla Warfare
By Major Patricia D Hoffman. 2015
This study analyzes the feasibility of guerrilla warfare as the basis for a strategy of airpower employment for a weak…
air force confronting an opponent with a stronger air force. The analysis begins with a distillation of the theory of guerrilla warfare into five elements essential to its success: superior intelligence, security, mobility advantage, surprise, and sustainment. The author then compares the ground combat environment of the traditional guerrilla with the airpower environment of the potential air guerrilla and concludes that these five elements can be met in the airpower environment provided the weak force has sufficient ingenuity and the necessary resources. An investigation of recent trends in technology and the prevailing strategic environment indicates that it increasingly possible for a weak force to obtain these resources. The author assesses that air guerrilla warfare is a viable warfighting strategy, but points out that the likelihood of a weak force actually adopting air guerrilla warfare will depend on its regional security needs and its resolve to protract a conflict. The study concludes that air guerrilla warfare is a credible threat to a stronger opponent. To meet this threat, the author recommends that the United States re-examine its intervention strategy, reinforce its policy of strategic engagement, and research both airpower and non-airpower means to neutralize an elusive guerrilla air force.Japan’s Decision For War In 1941: Some Enduring Lessons - War College Series
By Jeffrey Record. 2015
Japan's decision to attack the United States in 1941 is widely regarded as irrational to the point of suicidal. How…
could Japan hope to survive a war with, much less defeat, an enemy possessing an invulnerable homeland and an industrial base 10 times that of Japan? The Pacific War was one that Japan was always going to lose, so how does one explain Tokyo's decision? Did the Japanese recognize the odds against them? Did they have a concept of victory, or at least of avoiding defeat? Or did the Japanese prefer a lost war to an unacceptable peace?Dr. Jeffrey Record takes a fresh look at Japan's decision for war, and concludes that it was dictated by Japanese pride and the threatened economic destruction of Japan by the United States. He believes that Japanese aggression in East Asia was the root cause of the Pacific War, but argues that the road to war in 1941 was built on American as well as Japanese miscalculations and that both sides suffered from cultural ignorance and racial arrogance. Record finds that the Americans underestimated the role of fear and honor in Japanese calculations and overestimated the effectiveness of economic sanctions as a deterrent to war, whereas the Japanese underestimated the cohesion and resolve of an aroused American society and overestimated their own martial prowess as a means of defeating U.S. material superiority. He believes that the failure of deterrence was mutual, and that the descent of the United States and Japan into war contains lessons of great and continuing relevance to American foreign policy and defense decision-makers.The Reminiscences Of Newton Cannon, First Sergeant, 11th Tennessee Cavalry, CSA
By Sergeant Newton Cannon. 2015
One of the most valuable by-products of the commemoration of the 100th Anniversary of our War between the States, or…
Civil War, has been the bringing to light of narratives of personal experiences in the war written by surviving veterans of the Confederate and Union armies. Such narratives, though sometimes somewhat at variance with the formal, official reports made by commanding officers, provide an impressive and often vivid picture of the ups and downs of actual army life as experienced by the man in the ranks. He may not have had at all times a very clear idea of the strategy involved in the movements he was making, but he knew exactly how he was personally affected by these movements, and his warm-blooded and uninhibited account of the campaigns and battles in which he was engaged provides some of the most important and valuable raw material for the historical researcher and writer.A particularly engaging narrative of this kind is that of Sergeant Newton Cannon of Williamson County, Tennessee. He came of distinguished ancestry...His grandfather, Newton Cannon, had been a militia colonel in the Creek War, later serving as a member of Congress and as Governor of Tennessee. His father had served in the Seminole War in Florida, where he was wounded; and, as Mr. Cannon took pride in recalling, his own son, Newton Cannon, Jr., served in the Spanish-American War, and his younger son took part in World War I.A month before his sixteenth birthday in 1862, Sergeant Cannon enlisted in Company I of the 11th Tennessee Cavalry of the Confederate Army, which was organized in Williamson County by his double first cousin, Captain Thomas F. Perkins, Jr. He served throughout the war with this company, seeing active service under General Nathan Bedford Forrest and General Joe Wheeler, and he was the company's First Sergeant when, with the remnant of Forrest's command, he surrendered and was paroled at Gainesville, Alabama, in 1865.A Study In Leadership: The 761st Tank Battalion And The 92d Division In World War II
By Major Lenora A Ivy. 2015
This thesis evaluates leadership in the 761st Tank Battalion and the 92d Division, two black units during World War II.…
Leaders in each unit were evaluated on their ability to use the following leadership model: technical skills (job experience, technical competence, and the ability to correlate facts into meaningful information); conceptual skills (vision and the ability to task organize to accomplish the mission); and interpersonal skills (job related standards and the ability to foster mutual trust and respect) to influence combat effectiveness.The analysis showed that the leaders in the 761st Tank Battalion demonstrated skills in the leadership model effectively and especially were successful in demonstrating interpersonal skills. Its successful combat record supports that its leaders were effective. On the other hand, the leaders in the 92d Division failed to properly demonstrate the skills of the leadership model. The lack of interpersonal skills used by leaders in the division (developing trust and mutual respect) was the major cause of the unit's combat failures.This study showed that despite negative beliefs about Negro soldiers there were some leaders who effectively applied interpersonal leadership skills in the interest of mission accomplishment.Conduct And Support Of Amphibious Operations From United States Submarines In World War II
By LCDR Brian J. Haggerty USN. 2015
The U.S. Navy is building Virginia class submarines, and recently completed the conversion of four Ohio class submarines from Trident…
Ballistic Missile Submarines (SSBN's) to Guided Missile Submarines (SSGNs). The Virginia class is the first nuclear powered fast attack submarine (SSN) that shipyards designed with SOF capability without requiring conversion. The SSGN conversion of the first four Ohio class submarines included substantial SOF capability. These construction and conversion projects represent a significant investment in SOF and amphibious capabilities, and they follow a long line of submarine conversions that began early in World War II. By analyzing three World War II operations, this monograph argues that knowing what actually happened in amphibious operations conducted and supported by American submarines in World War II provides valuable insight about the scope of capabilities, challenges and benefits of submarines for these kinds of missions in naval warfare. The first operation is an amphibious raid on Makin Atoll. The second involves the amphibious landings on the northwest Africa coast as part of Operation Torch. The final operation includes the landings on Attu Island in the Aleutian chain.An Operational Level Analysis Of Soviet Armored Formations In The Deliberate Defense In The Battle Of Kursk, 1943
By Major Charles L. Crow. 2015
This study is an historical analysis of the Soviet operational use of tank and mechanized corps, and tank armies, in…
the deliberate defense at the Battle of Kursk in 1943. It centers on the question of how effective was the Red Army in employing these units during this momentous battle. Events that shaped the battle and a brief comparison of forces set the stage. A discussion of the actual battle on the Central and Voronezh Fronts is followed by an analysis of the effectiveness of the employment of the operational armored units.The battle analysis methodology as promulgated by the Combat Studies Institute at the United States Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, established the guidelines for the study. Both Western and Soviet sources were utilized. Objectivity and compatibility of all available source material were of paramount importance in establishing the validity and accuracy of various accounts.The study concludes the Soviets prepared superbly for the operational battle; however, execution fell short of expectations. Because this was the first time the Soviets used tank armies in battle, an analysis of Kursk serves as an excellent catalyst for subsequent examination of present Soviet defensive doctrine and the use of tank armies in defense.